WEBVTT

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[All right, Sarah. Are you ready? Here we go. One last time. All yours.

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Let's do this thing one last time.]

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Hello, hello, hello. We are here.

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For one, final, bring it on home. Pull everything together session, and this awesomeness is going to be shepherd in by Ayse and Chiara. [Woo!]

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That's you.

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Is that the transition? All right. Well, I'm Chiara McKinney. I'm a structural engineer at Estructure, which is a small firm in the Bay Area. We do a lot of hospital work.

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And my co-moderator is Ayse Hortacsu, Director of Projects at the Applied Technology Council. Ayse, I think you should give a, if you're waving, I don't see you, but I'll trust that you're over there.

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So if you have a question during our session, type it in the chat or else we can also unmute you at the end. Or I guess maybe you can unmute yourself.

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I don't know exactly how this works. But if you have a question in the chat that we want to elevate for a discussion at the end, we might do that.

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But the speakers will be responding to your questions as we go.

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Welcome to the session,"Failure is not an option, keeping hospitals and fire stations operational."

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We have four speakers today touching on a few major themes, including California regulations for mandatory seismic strengthening of hospitals. So you'll learn about what they are, what the timeline looks like,

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and what the status is currently of our hospitals in terms of meeting those deadlines.

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You'll also hear a lot about non-structural components, which are two words that I think if you are ever stuck talking to a structural engineer who works at hospitals 

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and they start talking about their work, they will probably tell you a lot about non-structural components.

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Or at least I'm speaking for myself, and then we have two of our presenters did perform reconnaissance after the 2023 Turkey earthquakes and they do have some insights to share about hospital performance from their experience.

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And then another major theme is talking about modeling impact of loss from a essential services.

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So without further ado, I will introduce Catherine Austin Scott of the California Hospital Association, whose presentation is entitled Status of Seismic Retrofits for Hospitals in the Bay Area.

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And Northern California, in light of the 2030 state deadline.

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Good afternoon and thank you for letting me join you this afternoon. My name is Catherine Scott, Senior Vice President for State Relations and Advocacy here at the California Hospital Association.

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I've been working for hospitals for over 20 years, and in most of that time, I've been working on seismic compliance issues.

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I look forward to talking with you today about the opportunities and challenges as we head toward the next deadline.

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Quickly, just to remind folks, we have two deadlines that hospitals have to meet.

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First, our hospitals must remain standing after an earthquake. For most of our hospitals, we've met that first deadline.

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Second, we have to remain fully operational after a major earthquake.

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And we'll talk more about that shortly. 403 of our hospitals have met the requirement to stay standing after a major earthquake.

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There are 11 hospitals and 24 buildings that are managing this requirement now.

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Many of those buildings are moving services out of the buildings currently in existence.

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Or constructing new buildings that will require the operational standard as well.

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They'll meet that further second standard I discussed earlier. We do not have an exact total of the cost calculations for the first mandate, but we're confident that we've spent, that our hospitals have spent roughly tens of billions of dollars on meeting that standard that requires our hospitals to remain standing.

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You were…

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As mentioned, our hospitals must ensure basic operations will be available when they meet that second standard.

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This means they will need to brace utility lines in the walls and other activities to ensure services remain operational.

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This is an even greater challenge than the last mandate, that first remain standing mandate.

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Our hospitals will need to open walls, move or remove services to manage the construction.

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For many of our hospitals, there's not enough space to build a new tower. So therefore, they have to use the room available.

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Some are going room by room to do this construction. Others are moving service lines entirely.

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Or moving in a service to moving out the service to manage construction.

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And then there are those who simply can't afford the second requirement. This is going to mean changes in service for hospitals across the state.

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But let's look at the Bay Area. 37 hospitals in the Bay Area have to meet that 2030 mandate. Again, that mandate to remain operational.

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This means construction should be taking place at some level on all of these hospitals.

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That's just a short five years away. This will reduce services, including surgical availability and increase ER wait times significantly.

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Speaking frankly and from what those who live in the Bay Area can see This is not going to get done by 2030.

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And given the critical need to maintain services, a policy solution is needed.

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As the California Department of Public Health monitors the availability of services in our communities.

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They continue to grow more concerned about program flexes and hospital downsizing.

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It is becoming more difficult for our hospitals to manage the service needs currently As we work to meet this mandate, it will grow even more concerning for patient access in the areas where we have a large majority of hospitals that have to meet

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This 2030 requirement. Hospitals are all too familiar to be clear about the critical importance to be available during and after an earthquake.

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Or any type of disaster, frankly. Our teams prepare, plan, and drill for all disasters.

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California has and will continue to face multiple disasters It is our new reality. Given that nearly all hospitals have met the standard to remain standing after an earthquake.

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They can and drill to earthquake preparedness.

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They can evacuate a hospital if needed. And have planned for alternatives for patient services in the event utilities or other equipment is out.

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Unfortunately, the cost of this mandate has become prohibitive to some of our hospitals.

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Therefore, they will and could decrease services or shutter services entirely. So we are looking at alternatives as we work towards meeting this requirement.

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Some policy considerations have been put in place. Last year, the governor signed AB 869 This is a program available to our small, rural, and critical access hospitals.

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And our healthcare districts. They can get up to a three-year extension depending on the needs of the construction project.

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If they are financially at risk, they can also get an additional two years.

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Or if they've had delays in construction. Materials or as we say, acts of God.

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Government entitlements or other such issues. This would take them out to 2035.

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Unfortunately, as I said, we still have hospitals, even with this extension, that can't afford the requirement.

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So we will need to think about what we do for our rural hospitals that don't have the funds and or capital to manage this type of expense.

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For the field at large, California Hospital Association last year sponsored a bill that would provide the same type of extension and up to five-year extension for hospitals depending on what they need.

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So, for example, if a hospital is under construction now and needs an additional two years to build that new tower.

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Or needs just a couple of years to manage construction and retrofit in their building they would get up to say 20, 30 or 35.

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Or 32, depending on what they need. The extension would be based on the needs of the hospitals, as I said, and the needs of that specific construction project.

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It will allow hospitals to balance the access to services and maintain affordability.

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Unfortunately, that bill was vetoed, so we are still working on policy solutions that will address this issue As I said, because many of our hospitals will not meet that 2030 requirement.

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We look forward to working with all of you as we consider those policy solutions to ensure our hospitals maintain disaster preparedness, including earthquakes.

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Manage access to services. And balance affordability.

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If we haven't answered any of your questions in the upcoming Q&A, please give Trina Gonzalez or myself a call.

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Email and emails are included. Look forward to talking with you in the Q&A.

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So our next presentation is by Gordy Ray of Dagenkolb Engineers and That presentation is non-structural performance of California hospitals.

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Hello, I'm Gordon Ray from Deckon Cove Engineers, and this session is the non-structural performance of California hospitals.

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Technical engineers, for those who may not know, is a structural engineering firm with 10 offices among the West Coast.

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Mexico and Michigan. And I myself have personally been there for more than 20 years, primarily working in the healthcare field.

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On the evaluation of these existing hospital buildings with the goal of seismic compliance by 2030.

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So my presentation today is going to be focusing on, touch a little bit on the history of seismic compliance of California hospitals.

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We'll talk about what is non-structural And why are we concerned about it?

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Talk through the definition of the non-structural performance categories. Look at the current activities and then some talk about non-structural observations of hospitals in Turkey.

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Through the 2023 earthquakes that I had the opportunity to visit as part of a delegation from California looking at hospitals.

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So looking backwards. In 1971 was the Silmar earthquake. And this was a milestone event because it damaged a number of California hospitals, resulting in closure of the buildings, collapse, and many deaths. So this was a trigger event that ultimately resulted in the Hospital Act, which required that new healthcare facilities were designed to withstand a major earthquake and remain

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Operational these were reviewed and administered by the state under the Office of State Architects.

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In 1980, OSHPOG was formed, and this was an agency specific to hospitals.

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To review structural drawings, review the contents, the non-structural anchorage review the seismic bracing of the AMEP systems and provide that continuity to the field inspection and quality control during construction. So this was a major development to ensure high quality construction of hospitals.

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Jumping ahead to 1994, we had the Northridge earthquake, where many of the pre-1973 hospitals performed poorly.

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Which resulted in Senate Bill 1953 in the late 1990s that amended the Alquist Act and required evaluations and ratings of all general care hospital buildings, including those designed prior to 1973.

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So OSHPD was given the authority to define earthquake performance categories to meet the intent of the law.

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And this bill established the 2030 deadline for all hospital buildings, including those built 1973 and before.

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So talking a bit, what is non-structural? This is a word that we use a lot in the engineering field, but I recognize it may not translate to all disciplines right away.

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So non-structural is defined as part of an architectural, mechanical, or electrical system within a building So this is all the stuff within a building that's not the steel and the concrete. So ceilings and partitions and equipment and furniture and components and

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Piping and ducting and everything else is part of the non-structural definition.

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And generally, non-structural components do make up a majority of the replacement of most buildings. This is especially true for hospitals where the contents and non-structural is the vast majority of the cost of a construction compared to the cost of the structure.

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So again, why are we concerned with it? And that's because hospitals are essential facilities with expectations for continued operation following the design earthquake.

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And for essential operation, all the parts need to be working. It's only as strong as its weakest link and non-structural failures can certainly shut down facilities. We've seen this time and time again.

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Often the non-structural system is the first to go in terms of damage within an earthquake. So it's more likely that we're going to see failures of non-structural systems then damage to the primary structural system.

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So speaking of what the non-structural performance categories are within the HCAI OSHP, definition as we look forward to the 2030 compliance, we've got Two categories of NPC4, that's 4D and 4, and these pertain to the bracing of all the internal components and systems within a hospital.

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And then we've got MPC5. Npc4d is a lighter version of NPC4.

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Where we're just focused on the bracing of selected components within the critical care areas and the physical plant areas of the hospital. So it's a subset of all the areas.

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If a facility is targeting NPC4D that requires a post-earthquake operation plan.

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And it requires that any renovation project past 2030 We'll address all the deficiencies from slab to slab so there's a there's a trigger that you can't just do a focused renovation. You've really got to do everything in future in the future.

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Npc4 is more of a tact of let's do it all now. It's the bracing and anchorage of all the components and equipment within the acute care buildings.

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Inclusive of critical care areas, office spaces, conference rooms, the whole thing.

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Brace at all. Then NPC5 is the requirement to provide a 72 hour backup or water, wastewater, and fuel tanks.

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So NPC4D or NPC4 is required as well as NPC5 by 2030.

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So I'm going to talk for a minute about what is included in the NPC4D and NPC4 scope of work.

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So imagine a hospital room like the one depicted in this picture.

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Where the critical care space is in the room with the bed and the doctor.

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Assume to the right of this partition wall here. Assume this space is more of like an administrative office space.

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So for NPC4D. Scope is above ceiling work. So bracing a larger diameter piping fuel piping and fire sprinklers that's all needs to be done to achieve 4D.

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The ceiling itself requires requires bracing except for smaller rooms

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And then many below ceiling components and equipment require bracing. This is things like surgical lights, sterilizers, blankets.

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And then mechanical equipment like air handlers, chillers, pumps, and all that gear.

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So, you know, take a mental picture of this image as we look ahead to the MPC4 scope.

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Here's the same room, but now above ceiling, there's more to do.

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So it's not only just the large diameter pipes, it includes the conduit. It includes ducts, it includes fire sprinkler. So more work in the above ceiling.

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Again, the ceilings themselves require bracing. But again, also in the administrative space next door And the below ceiling components require bracing again also in the the administrative space next door.

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For NPC4, all the elevators also require bracing so this is Looking at the guide rails and looking at the rails making sure they're supported at adequate spacing.

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So within a hospital, like I mentioned, NPC4D is a subset of all the areas within a hospital.

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And if you're focusing on 4D, Then we're focusing on those critical care areas such as ICUs, emergency rooms, labor and delivery.

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Surgery departments. Well, NPC4 is everything else, which is inclusive of the things listed here.

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Typical patient beds, cafeteria, conference rooms, and the like. For a typical full service hospital, the NPC4D area is about 30% the overall square footage.

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So it is a significant reduction. To focus on 4D.

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The thing that the thing that comes with doing 4D. The catch is that you have to have an operational plan of how you would maintain service to other areas.

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And this operational plan is posted publicly on the OSHPD website.

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So remember that if you're doing 4D with reduced scope, that does require this operational plan to be published.

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Then this is a diagram, a similar diagram that shows the scope of equipment subject to NPC4D and NPC4.

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Where NPC4D includes the mechanical equipment, essential medical equipment fire sprinklers, piping systems, and other fixed equipment.

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And NPC4 is in this category of everything else. So your ducting and your cable trays and conduit above ceiling.

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It's all the MEP equipment, all the elevators, all the ceilings, lights, and essential equipment greater than 100 pounds.

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There are things that are exempt from both. That includes the mobile equipment and you know small light and low equipment outside of the patient care vicinity.

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These don't require bracing under any of the programs. So these slides are showing examples of typical equipment that requires anchorage for NPC 40 and 4.

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So we've got big electrical switch gear and transformers and chillers, fume hoods, some other piping mechanical equipment here.

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Keep in mind, this is all stuff that existed prior to OSHPD permits. So prior to 19, 73 or so.

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These. Any equipment that was installed and any renovation that was done under OSHPD permit is qualifies for NPC4. So all that stuff doesn't require bracing, but the old stuff still does.

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Here's some more examples, some refrigerators, some large cabinets, slide drawers, file drawers.

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These big heavy things that could tip over. Cause damage, cause injury in an earthquake are required to be braced.

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And then we get into the big puzzle of the above ceiling systems.

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So. In both NPC4 and 4D, seismic bracing is required of above ceiling piping and distribution systems. This picture on the left is an actual picture from a hospital where the ceiling was removed from a renovation project.

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And you can see the density of the piping and the utility systems that exist up there.

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Which are subject to seismic bracing. And when you look in this room, it's not even… clear if it's possible.

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To reach the deck with a brace and a hanger. Adequate to support and brace that pipe.

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So there's a big puzzle of access and approach to how this work is going to be done.

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There's a couple different approaches being discussed you know including field surveys and you know marking up drawings with pencil and paper or on bluebeam Or even doing 3D scanning work to identify the as-built condition that's translated to a Revant model like you'd see on the right here.

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But all of this investigation work is is costly and it's disruptive to the space.

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So there's strategies being discussed on how to minimize the disruption to the space and whether we need to disrupt it once to document it.

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Before design and then disrupted again to construct it. Or if there's another way. And HCAI has issued an advisory guide on essentially deferring all the discovery until the construction phase so that you could open up the ceiling once You could observe the piping, quickly design the piping.

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Install the braces and close it up within an expedited process.

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So that's being explored and understood. It's a newly released process that HKI is rolling out.

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And lastly, the NPC5 is the holding tank. These are often underground holding tanks.

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It's great if you've got a large site and maybe you've got a parking lot or some extra land to drop some tanks in.

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Very difficult if you're an urban impacted site with no no extra tanks or no extra room no extra ground for tanks.

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So speaking briefly about the current activities and the deadlines, non-structural evaluation reports were done last year. This inventory hundreds of thousands of components within buildings.

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To identify the deficiencies. The current activity is to prepare construction drawings both for the equipment and For the above ceiling utilities in various forms, whether it's sort of general to be defined later or if it's more invasive full documentation during design

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As well as those MPC-5 tanks. Building permits are required in 2028 and ultimately completion of the projects and reclassification is done by 2030.

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So as I mentioned, I did have the opportunity to visit Turkey after the 2023 earthquakes.

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We went and looked at hospitals specifically and saw that many had been closed.

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Not for structural damage, but for non-structural damage. Here's an example of ceiling systems and furniture and equipment that has toppled. This facility was closed.

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On the left here is a very tragic example of the actual stair tower.

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Came free of the building and collapsed. Stranding patients in rooms without a way to get down.

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Another internal problem with another problem with a stair tower, elevator damage. So these damage to egress ways are not part of the primary system but you know are very important to the performance of the building.

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We see examples of toppled equipment and tanks. We see examples of damage to above ceiling systems and to utilities. This is all The types of constructions that we saw in Turkey were very similar to what we see in the US.

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In terms of the architectural mechanical Plumbing systems. The structural systems were a bit different But all the interior parts were largely the same and were subject to damage.

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We saw medical equipment that came down. Here's scanners and different ceiling suspended equipment that's not operational if the room around it's falling apart.

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Again, furniture toppling, shelving units falling over, making these spaces unusable.

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And lastly, kind of speaking to the importance of emergency backup systems, here was a generator that was asked to run for up to a couple of weeks after the earthquake. So even finding fuel for this generator was quite a challenge for this facility.

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Water tanks were needed. Lucky when they had them, water was interrupted.

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So these are real scenarios that happen in an earthquake, a little preview of what could happen in California. And I felt fortunate to have this window into a real world experience.

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So with that, this concludes my presentation and happy to See if I can answer any other questions in the chat.

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Thank you.

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Thank you, Gordy. So Gordy took us from California to Turkey, and now we will have Dr. Luis Seferino take us from Turkey back to California.

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Hello, this is Luis Efarino. I'm an assistant professor at UC Berkeley.

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And today I'd like to share with you insights into the earthquake resiliency of hospitals from fair work in Turkey and disaster risk analysis in the Bay Area.

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This map shows that in the 21st century, we have had massive earthquake emergencies.

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In fact, six earthquakes injured more than 100,000 people each. Highlighting the importance of having well-functioning hospitals in earthquake emergencies.

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The recent or semi-recent 2023 Turkey earthquake is another example of this.

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And Eric Creek Emergencies are extremely challenging. They are because they are sudden, they have little or no warning, and they can affect multiple cities As a result, many people, thousands or hundreds of thousands of people can be injured and may require urgent care.

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To deliver treatment to them. Many critical services must operate well in the emergency This is challenging because they need to be supported by infrastructure that is often damaged during or after earthquakes.

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In my research group, we see this problem with the Arabic survival chain framework.

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Where we have identified the critical services that are after a large earthquake.

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And those are search and rescue, patient mobilization. And medical treatment. Each of them supported by different infrastructure.

00:27:02.000 --> 00:27:09.000
It's important that all of them work well in an earthquake emergency to deliver treatment to people.

00:27:09.000 --> 00:27:17.000
And the weakest link will be the one that defines how vulnerable is the emergency response system in a region.

00:27:17.000 --> 00:27:25.000
So we will utilize this framework today in this presentation to first present field observations from the 2023 Turkey Syria earthquake.

00:27:25.000 --> 00:27:38.000
And then we also demonstrate how disaster risk analysis models can help us understand and visualize what future emergencies might look like. The application of these models are going to be to the Bay Area in California.

00:27:38.000 --> 00:27:43.000
So let's go first to the field work. After the 2023 Turkey earthquake.

00:27:43.000 --> 00:27:49.000
I was fortunate to lead a team, an interdisciplinary team with expertise from civil engineering and emergency response and search and rescue.

00:27:49.000 --> 00:27:55.000
To the most affected area after the earthquake in Turkey. And that is Hadai and gramangawaras.

00:27:55.000 --> 00:28:01.000
We also investigated Arana because it was very important for the emergency services we'll discuss later.

00:28:01.000 --> 00:28:16.000
So we visited three hospitals. Which has more than 500 beds and 150 ICUs in the Hatai province. This was the most affected region.

00:28:16.000 --> 00:28:23.000
Which is the largest, one of the largest space isolated hospitals in the world. It has more than 1,500 beds.

00:28:23.000 --> 00:28:27.000
And more than 100 ICUs, which is massive. It's a massive hospital.

00:28:27.000 --> 00:28:35.000
We also went to Karamang Mares and studied a hospital there, but for time constraints, because of time constraints, I'll cover only the Mustafa Kemal University.

00:28:35.000 --> 00:28:47.000
And the other city hospitals in this presentation. To investigate the hospitals, we utilize a questionnaire, an adaptation of one that was developed by Dr. Judith Mitrani Reiser.

00:28:47.000 --> 00:28:54.000
Which has multiple sections to understand what happened with the medical services after earthquakes in hospitals.

00:28:54.000 --> 00:28:59.000
The questionnaire has six sections, but we focus on the first three.

00:28:59.000 --> 00:29:08.000
And we learned a lot from them. We went to the Mustafa Kemal University in Hatai, the area that was affected the most by the earthquake.

00:29:08.000 --> 00:29:13.000
And the hospital was able to deliver treatment within the main building.

00:29:13.000 --> 00:29:19.000
After the earthquake. Two weeks after they had to evacuate to the parking lot, as you can see on the picture to our right.

00:29:19.000 --> 00:29:26.000
They form a field hospital and also they had to set up containers for temporary housing for the healthcare staff.

00:29:26.000 --> 00:29:31.000
We interviewed the medical personnel and We had very interesting findings.

00:29:31.000 --> 00:29:37.000
First, the doctors reported that they had to perform multiple surgeries after the earthquake.

00:29:37.000 --> 00:29:51.000
And those were disrupted by aftershocks. You have to remember that they were within the hospital, but many buildings outside the hospital it had collapsed. So they were fearing for their lives and whether or not the building of the hospital was going to collapse or not.

00:29:51.000 --> 00:29:55.000
They had to perform several amputations, unfortunately, after the air week.

00:29:55.000 --> 00:30:03.000
And unfortunately, also imagining services were reduced and those are needed for trauma injuries.

00:30:03.000 --> 00:30:05.000
Because there was fear from the staff to occupy these rooms.

00:30:05.000 --> 00:30:13.000
Medical staff, unfortunately, were also victims Many of them lost their homes.

00:30:13.000 --> 00:30:20.000
And also doctors reported that non-injured people looked for other support in hospitals.

00:30:20.000 --> 00:30:32.000
Looking for food delivery and other services as well, revealing how important our hospitals after earthquakes.

00:30:32.000 --> 00:30:49.000
Regarding the operations, as I mentioned before, the hospital was evacuated two weeks after the earthquake following an aftershock that was a moderate-sized aftershock This aftershock damage on structural components in the hospital on the upper floor.

00:30:49.000 --> 00:31:02.000
And this just increased the risk perception of collapse. From the staff and they decided to evacuate both staff and patients and they form the field hospitals that you saw in the parking lot in the slide before.

00:31:02.000 --> 00:31:10.000
At the end, the hospital in the parking lot was still operating at the time of when we conducted the surveys, which was a month after the earthquake.

00:31:10.000 --> 00:31:21.000
And it was operating as an emergency department there. We also inquired about the lifelines at the hospital. We found that the water lifelines performed well and they had their own water source.

00:31:21.000 --> 00:31:34.000
The medical system also performed well. Unfortunately, the communication systems fail, which was quite bad because they had to transfer and coordinate patient transfers and deliveries.

00:31:34.000 --> 00:31:40.000
There was a power outage in the region and they have power backup systems as many hospitals.

00:31:40.000 --> 00:31:44.000
Which worked for six hours well until they ran out of fuel.

00:31:44.000 --> 00:31:49.000
Getting fuel after was a nightmare because of the traffic jams.

00:31:49.000 --> 00:32:04.000
So to transfer patients also, many patients wanted to be transferred from Hatai to Adana I know that was a big hospital which wasn't, which didn't sustain that much patients had to go through tremendous traffic jams and you can see here

00:32:04.000 --> 00:32:15.000
There are some ambulances there that are trying to which are in this massive traffic jam which Then we went to the Dana Hospital, which is the one that received lots of patients from Hatai.

00:32:15.000 --> 00:32:19.000
This is one of the largest base isolated hospitals in the world.

00:32:19.000 --> 00:32:30.000
Here we interviewed the operations team instead of the medical staff And the operations team was formed by different engineers, mechanical engineers and civil engineers.

00:32:30.000 --> 00:32:35.000
They told us that the hospital had continuous operations after the earthquake.

00:32:35.000 --> 00:32:43.000
They verify that the whole physical system was working. They didn't communicate as much with the doctors, which was a surprise.

00:32:43.000 --> 00:32:53.000
For us, but in the review, all the physical system was okay so they they assumed that all the services or no services were affected after the earthquake.

00:32:53.000 --> 00:33:09.000
One main challenge was that they had to receive the patient search especially from, especially from patients that came from Hatai And patients were transferred in different modalities through ambulances, as you saw before.

00:33:09.000 --> 00:33:23.000
And also through helicopters. So this hospital was very important, not just for its catchment community, it was also important for neighboring regions, which highlights why functional hospitals or resilient hospitals are very important for an emergency response.

00:33:23.000 --> 00:33:47.000
There were additional challenges also to the emergency response. In Hattay especially, there are many medium-rise concrete buildings collapsed In narrow streets which blocked many roads. We talked to search and rescue teams and they highlighted that there was a massive challenge to mobilize patients and get ambulances closest to

00:33:47.000 --> 00:34:00.000
Closer to where the patients were. It was quite a struggle for them and they reported to have emergency or the search and rescue Operations lasted almost three weeks. That's what they reported.

00:34:00.000 --> 00:34:14.000
An additional challenge for them was that many tools and ambulances for the emergency response where damaged and they the firefighters of Hatai this is in antakeya the city in Hatai.

00:34:14.000 --> 00:34:19.000
We went there and they reported that they weren't able to use many, many of their equipment.

00:34:19.000 --> 00:34:31.000
Now in the next part of the presentation, I want to show you how disaster risk analysis can help us understand what potential future emergencies, earthquake emergencies might look like.

00:34:31.000 --> 00:34:39.000
The Bay Area is a very interesting case because he hasn't had a large earthquake since the 1906 San Andreas earthquake.

00:34:39.000 --> 00:34:42.000
The previous earthquakes or most recent earthquakes have been only moderate.

00:34:42.000 --> 00:35:03.000
Like the 1971 San Fernando earthquake or the 1994 Nordic earthquake, which already have revealed lots of vulnerabilities in the hospital infrastructure. In fact, the 1994 Norfolk earthquake led to Senate Bill 1953 which require hospitals to be upgraded or retrofitted by 2030.

00:35:03.000 --> 00:35:07.000
We want them to have continuous operations even after a large earthquake.

00:35:07.000 --> 00:35:13.000
However, it is very likely that due to financial stress, many hospitals won't meet this goal.

00:35:13.000 --> 00:35:18.000
The hospital infrastructure in the Bay Area, it's quite exposed to high seismic hazards.

00:35:18.000 --> 00:35:26.000
There are 76 healthcare campuses Many of them are close to major faults like the San Andreas fault or the Hayward Fault.

00:35:26.000 --> 00:35:34.000
There are more than 400 buildings in total that belong to these hospitals, but multiple are all buildings.

00:35:34.000 --> 00:35:42.000
Even some that were built before the 19 73 Alquis Act of for hospitals.

00:35:42.000 --> 00:35:45.000
To understand what would happen with these hospitals after a large air.

00:35:45.000 --> 00:35:54.000
We ran a network risk analysis. We use the hardware scenario which is a magnitude 7.2 earthquake on the Hayward Fault. You can see the rupture geometry there.

00:35:54.000 --> 00:36:04.000
And we utilize a ground motion model, a state-of-the-art ground motion model to analyze the ground shaking in the region. And you can see the hospitals there on black dots.

00:36:04.000 --> 00:36:11.000
So we ran 5,000 simulations here and you're seeing the median of the peak and on acceleration on the region there.

00:36:11.000 --> 00:36:17.000
A quick damage on the more than 400 buildings of the acute care hospitals in the Bay Area.

00:36:17.000 --> 00:36:22.000
We used the rich information that California has on the structural topologies of all of these buildings.

00:36:22.000 --> 00:36:28.000
Many of them are still moment frames and the second most common type is concrete shear walls, for example.

00:36:28.000 --> 00:36:41.000
We use fragility functions from Razus and then we adjusted them according to the specific seismic performance categories that each building has received in California, revealing how vulnerable they are.

00:36:41.000 --> 00:36:49.000
So we combine this information to create a methodology to be able to model the vulnerability of these hospitals.

00:36:49.000 --> 00:37:02.000
We also modeled on structural damage. We targeted acceleration sensitive components and modeling structural damage simulating representative peak for acceleration distributions for the building.

00:37:02.000 --> 00:37:09.000
Unfortunately, we don't know where different equipment on which floor different equipment is in each in each hospital.

00:37:09.000 --> 00:37:16.000
So we had to use a representative peak flow acceleration to model and non-structural component damage there.

00:37:16.000 --> 00:37:30.000
Similarly to the structural damage, we combine information from hazard stability function and adjust them to account for different non-structural performance categories that Each building has received in California.

00:37:30.000 --> 00:37:39.000
So we ran 5,000 simulations here and we are modeling the probability here or analyzing the probability here that the damage exceeds It's light.

00:37:39.000 --> 00:37:50.000
It's like category four, both the structural and non-structural components. As you can see the distribution of those probabilities here per hospital building.

00:37:50.000 --> 00:38:06.000
Showing that obviously the closer you are to the rupture, you have more probability to exceed this threshold. And notice that hospitals get disrupted at very early stages of damage. So even exceeding a slight damage can disrupt the functionality of the hospitals.

00:38:06.000 --> 00:38:11.000
So accordingly, we model the functionality of each hospital with a full tree.

00:38:11.000 --> 00:38:17.000
In which you have to ensure that both the non-structural components and the structural components are working.

00:38:17.000 --> 00:38:23.000
So that there is functionality in the hospital. And we put as a damage threshold as the slide category.

00:38:23.000 --> 00:38:31.000
Because we saw that in previous earthquakes, hospitals lose functionality at very early stages, as that much as mentioned before.

00:38:31.000 --> 00:38:40.000
So as a reference, for example, if you have a hospital that has a structural performance category of one and a structural performance category of one that those are the lowest.

00:38:40.000 --> 00:38:59.000
For a 0.2 G PGA and a point two um g peak foot acceleration, you get close to 20 percent probability of functioning of your hospital functioning. However, if you are a stronger hospital and you have a structural performance category of five and structural performance category of five.

00:38:59.000 --> 00:39:06.000
For the same demands, you get an 80% probability of functioning.

00:39:06.000 --> 00:39:21.000
So we use this simplified framework to analyze functionality in the region here and we ran 5,000 simulations here in the risk model again And we get the distribution of the total number of functional vets after this large earthquake on the Hayward Fault.

00:39:21.000 --> 00:39:34.000
And unfortunately, on average, we find that bed capacity within the buildings can be reduced dramatically to almost half in this very large scenario.

00:39:34.000 --> 00:39:45.000
In addition, we started to analyze hospital accessibility here. We use a network approach here to build direct graph through the transportation network.

00:39:45.000 --> 00:39:57.000
With vertices and edges that you can see there. So our objective was to find which is the closest hospital after the earthquake, considering that some of them can fail and you have to travel longer to go to the next hospital.

00:39:57.000 --> 00:40:05.000
Here were not considering bridge damage yet, but we are in these results, but we are actively working on that. So I'll have those results very, very soon.

00:40:05.000 --> 00:40:19.000
So this is our also our preliminary study here Here I'm comparing the travel times from pre-earquake to post airquake, right?

00:40:19.000 --> 00:40:26.000
And I'm highlighting here those that have the highest ratio of change between the travel time pre-earquake to post earthquake.

00:40:26.000 --> 00:40:37.000
That's green versus brown or red there. So one interesting case that I think that highlights how accessibility can change after the earthquake is number one. Number one, that's Richmond.

00:40:37.000 --> 00:40:49.000
In East Bay. We can see that the travel time there to the closest hospital, acute care hospital, could increase by more than a factor of four.

00:40:49.000 --> 00:40:54.000
So if we look at the network, we can see why rich money is affected the most by this earthquake.

00:40:54.000 --> 00:41:00.000
At the left, we have the roads that use the modes to get to the closest hospital.

00:41:00.000 --> 00:41:05.000
And we can see that the most important roads in this case in the precarit conditions on the left.

00:41:05.000 --> 00:41:07.000
Are the ones that are closest to the hospitals, as it should be.

00:41:07.000 --> 00:41:12.000
However, the situation changes when there is an earthquake. If we follow number one, for example.

00:41:12.000 --> 00:41:22.000
If the hospital in Bridgmon is lost, then the communities will have to travel south to almost downtown Auckland to the Kaiser Permanente Hospital there.

00:41:22.000 --> 00:41:38.000
If that hospital fails, then the communities there will have to travel all the way to San Francisco. That's why we see the thicker brown lines on Bay Bridge, for example, or they'll have to cross all the way to Sausalito to reach to the closest hospital, increasing their travel time significantly.

00:41:38.000 --> 00:41:42.000
Now, to conclude this presentation, I'd like to remind you that earthquake emergencies can be massive.

00:41:42.000 --> 00:41:56.000
We learn a lot from the Turkey-syria earthquakes a couple of years ago, and this highlighted the importance of the earthquake survival chain and all those services that are important to stabilize the health of people.

00:41:56.000 --> 00:42:08.000
Finally, our analysis in the Bay Area revealed that a large earthquake on the Hero Fault can severely disrupt the earthquake survival chain in the bay.

00:42:08.000 --> 00:42:12.000
So we must prepare for it. We must prepare to respond to it.

00:42:12.000 --> 00:42:18.000
With that, thank you. And I'd like to acknowledge all my collaborators, those that went with me to the field.

00:42:18.000 --> 00:42:23.000
In Turkey and also those who helped me develop this model for the bay.

00:42:23.000 --> 00:42:30.000
I also want to thank all the people who were super nice to meet with us in our field work in Turkey.

00:42:30.000 --> 00:42:36.000
We learned so much from them and they were so kind to us and we're forever thankful to them.

00:42:36.000 --> 00:42:40.000
Thank you.

00:42:40.000 --> 00:42:49.000
Thank you, Luis, for this presentation. Now that we heard about hospitals and how important they are for a community's recovery and resilience.

00:42:49.000 --> 00:43:01.000
We're going to hear about another link in the survival chain. We're going to hear about fire stations and Zhao Wan Connolly from the California Seismic Safety Commission will lead us into that.

00:43:01.000 --> 00:43:09.000
Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Jia Wang Connelly. I'm a senior structural engineer with the California Seismic Safety Commission.

00:43:09.000 --> 00:43:15.000
Part of Cal OES. The project we are presenting is California Fire Station Seismic.

00:43:15.000 --> 00:43:22.000
Risk assessment and retrofit benefit cost analysis.

00:43:22.000 --> 00:43:36.000
This is a team effort and here lists our commission staff participated in the project and we are also advised by Dianco Gold and Commissioner Vincent Wells.

00:43:36.000 --> 00:43:48.000
Here's the disclaimer. The results I'm presenting today are preliminary because the report has yet to be approved by the Commission and Cal OES.

00:43:48.000 --> 00:44:12.000
This project's objectives are to develop a building inventory of fire stations in California and how they comply to the 1986 Essential Services Act and then to understand the potential structural vulnerabilities to help inform mitigation strategies and then learn about funding sources.

00:44:12.000 --> 00:44:32.000
A barrier to funding and then barrier to to do risk assessment and benefit cost analysis using Hazard's AEBM module and a FEMA BCA toolkit. And then last but not least is to provide data to the fire stations who participate in the survey.

00:44:32.000 --> 00:44:39.000
To help them. Facilitate the HMA grant funding applications.

00:44:39.000 --> 00:45:08.000
If they so choose. And there are two phases of this effort. Phase one is to use the default building inventory data from hedges, the latest release from hazard 6.1, and run the ABM module and then BCA toolkit. And through the process we learned about how the benefit costs are quantified through this two methodology and then it

00:45:08.000 --> 00:45:19.000
Help us to inform how do we come up with survey questions. And then the phase two, after we collect the data from the survey, we're going to rerun the analysis.

00:45:19.000 --> 00:45:28.000
To get more accurate data based on the data collection from the survey.

00:45:28.000 --> 00:45:55.000
And today we're going to present the phase one results, which is using the default building inventory data. So has this AEBM with the latest building inventories used in the in phase one and then the results include the average annualized

00:45:55.000 --> 00:46:00.000
Lost due to building damages and annualized casualties at various severity levels for both day and night.

00:46:00.000 --> 00:46:11.000
And then AEBMs using the 2018 National Seismic Hazard Model from USGS. In comparison with hazards.

00:46:11.000 --> 00:46:31.000
Iebm, famous BCA toolkit uses 2014 USGS hazard model And then the BCA toolkit counts foreground motion hazards with return period under 100 years or has its AEBM consider those with return period?

00:46:31.000 --> 00:46:36.000
100 years or longer. And then in terms of how to quantify.

00:46:36.000 --> 00:47:03.000
The cost of seismic retrofit. We used a fairly all the female document, it's dated in 1994 just because FEMA hasn't updated this and then we didn't find any other more authoritative sources for this calculation. So we used the formula, the typical structural cost to seismically rehabilitate

00:47:03.000 --> 00:47:27.000
Building is calculated based on the building roofing cost and adjusted by the area and then the seismic performance objective And then the location adjustment factor, and time adjustment factor. So the location adjustment factor, we did not use from this 1994 document. Instead, we used the hassis 6.1 technical manual.

00:47:27.000 --> 00:47:36.000
And then the time adjustment factor, which we used the DGS California Construction Cost Index, CCCI.

00:47:36.000 --> 00:47:50.000
Published in DGS website. And then the mean value of the annual percentages between 1996 and 2023 are used to impute the missing years.

00:47:50.000 --> 00:48:14.000
And here's how we consider the input. We select the fire stations, are designated As the moderate code design level, which is constructed between 1941 in 1975 was building type of the most common building type is reinforced missionary low and then W1 in seismic zone four.

00:48:14.000 --> 00:48:26.000
And we… I feel like those inventories um change their design level from MC to high code and a special high code.

00:48:26.000 --> 00:48:50.000
To run the scenario, assuming that the building be retrofitted from MC to HC or MC to HS special high code. And then in the BCA calculator for the benefit provided by fire station as EMS emergency medical services. We assume the fire station serve

00:48:50.000 --> 00:49:05.000
30,000 population and the adjacent nearest adjacent fire station provide EMC service to those population are five miles away and those are the input for the BCA toolkit.

00:49:05.000 --> 00:49:15.000
And then I'm going to show the results, mainly four category. One is the benefit to cost ratio comparison between the ABBM and BCA toolkit.

00:49:15.000 --> 00:49:29.000
And then also using the BCA toolkit, we have the possibility to include or exclude the loss of functionality which is the EMS for the population.

00:49:29.000 --> 00:49:42.000
And then the benefit cost racial for seismic retrofit from mc to hc From MC to high code.

00:49:42.000 --> 00:49:50.000
Or from a moderate code to a special high code. And this is using Heiser's ABM.

00:49:50.000 --> 00:49:56.000
And then we are looking at the AAL composition.

00:49:56.000 --> 00:50:11.000
From the hazardous AEBM. And I'm going to present the results next. What you are seeing now is the two different building types, retrofit from MC to HC.

00:50:11.000 --> 00:50:26.000
Moderate cold to high code and the benefit cost ratio using hazards or BCA2 kit. As you can see the blue are hazards and the orange are BCA2 kit.

00:50:26.000 --> 00:50:30.000
It seemed like a BCA toolkit gave a bigger spread and a generally higher number.

00:50:30.000 --> 00:50:51.000
Intermoving benefit cost ratio. And then here it shows if we run the BCA toolkit, consider the functionality, the loss of functionality or without considering the functionality, what's the PCA ratio?

00:50:51.000 --> 00:51:12.000
And then as you can see, for the left is the missionary building and then the right is a wood building. It seemed like the wood building, the difference is more pronounced when it's included functionality or not, maybe because wood building has less casualty. So that's why the

00:51:12.000 --> 00:51:25.000
Functionality plays a bigger part. Then we can see the next is the results for seismic retrofit.

00:51:25.000 --> 00:51:33.000
To high code, from moderate code to high code, which is on the left

00:51:33.000 --> 00:52:00.000
And then… For on the left is for the missionary beauty and then on the right is for wood beauty so as you can see it seemed like when it's retrofitted from MC2HS, the benefit is relatively lower compared to the cost.

00:52:00.000 --> 00:52:24.000
For the two building types. And then the last we look at the, because Jesus IEBM allow us to post-processing data and then we can consider the loss of contents so we can break down the AL composition. And these two are for the missionary building

00:52:24.000 --> 00:52:33.000
The first one is the one If the building is under the moderate code.

00:52:33.000 --> 00:52:38.000
Design level. As you can see.

00:52:38.000 --> 00:53:02.000
Loss of casualty plays a major part for this. And then as the right is the mission of building if it were HC, high cold and then the you can see the loss of content seems to play a gradually more pronounced compared to the reduced loss of casualty.

00:53:02.000 --> 00:53:08.000
Because the booty ain't safer. And then the next is the mission rebuilding on the left.

00:53:08.000 --> 00:53:27.000
But it's HS, Special High Code, as you can see the casualty is even smaller and then the most lost come from the loss of content and then for the right, so we start looking at wood beauty. The wood building

00:53:27.000 --> 00:53:44.000
We can see this is the moderate code design level And then the loss of content seems pronounced because wood building generally is less collapse prone.

00:53:44.000 --> 00:54:12.000
And then the or less casualty and then then this slide shows the w1 type building that is a lost casualty On the left is the HC. It's high code and on the right is special high code as you can see the under both condition the

00:54:12.000 --> 00:54:23.000
Loss of content seems to be prominent compared to other category. And then the loss of casualty is one of the smallest.

00:54:23.000 --> 00:54:52.000
Is comparable with the loss of the structure. So we learned from this preliminary analysis using the default database, the following conclusion. But we'd like to just to clarify the absolute value of our benefit to cost racial if it's above or below the 1.0 threshold are in this case not as important as the relative values.

00:54:52.000 --> 00:55:19.000
Because we make a lot of assumptions and using the default data and then also there are some major assumptions using the FEMA 154 document. So the purpose here is more mainly focusing on looking at the BCI2Kit versus the hazards and EBM module to see how their input assumptions and

00:55:19.000 --> 00:55:26.000
And the methodology. So based on our study, it seemed like the BCA toolkit generally exhibit higher BCR.

00:55:26.000 --> 00:55:34.000
Pcr values, especially F, and this is from their update in September 2020.

00:55:34.000 --> 00:55:46.000
And then the BCA toolkit does not calculate the cost due to the content loss, avoidance, and then has this AEBM allow you to consider this in post-processing.

00:55:46.000 --> 00:55:51.000
And the loss of functionality analysis has significant benefit in BCI.

00:55:51.000 --> 00:55:56.000
But this is when we use the default data, which is 30,000.

00:55:56.000 --> 00:56:11.000
The population and then the closest five miles away, closest EMS fire station So after we collect the survey data, we notice that this has quite a spread.

00:56:11.000 --> 00:56:18.000
So we're going to look at it more closely in our phase two.

00:56:18.000 --> 00:56:35.000
Based on the survey data. And then it's interesting also based on our sample that it seemed like the current methodology to quantify the loss doesn't seem to justify to retrofit from MC to HS versus MC to high code.

00:56:35.000 --> 00:57:02.000
Just because how the benefit is quantified. And then so we have some preliminary recommendations, which is mainly to inform how the survey is done and also how we look at the retrofit. It seemed like the service could provide critical service as EMS has major benefit to increase the BCA value for the fire station.

00:57:02.000 --> 00:57:20.000
And then we need to collect the population served and EMS to if we want to consider the lost the functionality, which we did and then um adopt and refine risk assessment tools.

00:57:20.000 --> 00:57:28.000
So here is happy to report the survey results. So we launched the survey in April.

00:57:28.000 --> 00:57:49.000
15. 2024 with the assistant of fire chiefs in cal oes And then eight months later, we collected over a thousand responses. So now we establish about a third of building inventory statewide for fire stations.

00:57:49.000 --> 00:58:06.000
And we're in the process of working with Cal OES GIS team to create a dashboard to visualize what we collected and then also what we're going to provide from the phase two analysis as a benefit.

00:58:06.000 --> 00:58:20.000
Cost analysis and a risk assessment. That's my presentation. Thank you, Matt. Thank you very much for your attention and feel free to reach out if you have questions. Thank you.

00:58:20.000 --> 00:58:44.000
Thank you, Jacques. Fourth presentation, which concludes the recorded presentations for this session. So we will launch into the questions. So we hope that you can type in questions or raise your hand and Kiara and I will moderate the discussion. So all of our presenters are coming back online. I mean, they were online. They're turning their cameras back on.

00:58:44.000 --> 00:58:49.000
So you'll be able to have a conversation with these experts who made these excellent presentations.

00:58:49.000 --> 00:58:56.000
So as you're thinking about your questions, I wanted to start on a positive note.

00:58:56.000 --> 00:59:07.000
And I want to ask about some success stories. So, for example, Gordy, you have had a chance, you know, you've been working with hospital owners for over 20 years.

00:59:07.000 --> 00:59:17.000
What are some lessons you've learned from interacting with building owners? What are they like you know are they excited when it's done?

00:59:17.000 --> 00:59:46.000
I think certainly excited when it's done is is true. The retrofits are a challenge. And at many times it's a push to do something. It's a push to reevaluate the building's life cycle as these are 50 year old buildings we're talking about for hospitals, which often don't serve the public in the same way a brand new hospital building would.

00:59:46.000 --> 01:00:00.000
And so when we're talking about retrofitting a building, even though we're proponents of Seismic safety and retrofitting, you know, retrofit isn't always the best option. It could be what's needed to force a decision, whether from the board to or others to

01:00:00.000 --> 01:00:08.000
To decide to build new and I think at some point that becomes exciting too.

01:00:08.000 --> 01:00:19.000
To get to the point of needing to look ahead and look ahead get past these 50 year old buildings.

01:00:19.000 --> 01:00:20.000
Yeah.

01:00:20.000 --> 01:00:26.000
And even in the case of the retrofit, I'm assuming that you have to do a lot of education.

01:00:26.000 --> 01:00:39.000
About the non-structural components. And again, I'm hoping that there's some outreach to the occupants of the building to explain to them you know this is why we're ripping up your ceilings over the next three months.

01:00:39.000 --> 01:01:03.000
Yeah, the communication is important. And there actually was a state law passed in the last couple of years that requires posting of the the seismic performance categories on the inside of buildings. And so if you've been in a hospital recently, you'll see these little dial wheels that say this is an SPC2 and an NPC2 building. It's life safe, but it may not be functional after an earthquake.

01:01:03.000 --> 01:01:19.000
So I think part of informing the public is certainly public and the occupants, the staff of a building is important to to communicate the risk and why improvements are being made to the buildings.

01:01:19.000 --> 01:01:34.000
Great. Thank you. And I also wanted to acknowledge Trina Gonzalez with the California Hospital Association. She's the vice president for policy. So she's joining our panel as well as an expert.

01:01:34.000 --> 01:01:44.000
Great. So I will do the next question. So I guess I was curious to hear from Luis And maybe also Ja has some insight on this as well.

01:01:44.000 --> 01:02:03.000
Are there any factors that you find that are more difficult to model In terms of understanding impact to essential services so things that it that actually if maybe even like based on your experience in Turkey, you can see that affected how a facility

01:02:03.000 --> 01:02:13.000
Function, but it wasn't something you would have been able to model easily, you know, like how people behave in a certain circumstance or something like that.

01:02:13.000 --> 01:02:19.000
Yeah, thank you. I apologize for my voice because I have been sick over the last couple of days.

01:02:19.000 --> 01:02:34.000
I'll try my best to answer this. So yeah, I think there are many challenging parts in modeling an emergency. An emergency, the way I see it, it has two components. One, physical infrastructure component, right? I think engineers are better at modeling that.

01:02:34.000 --> 01:02:42.000
One human component, which is very unpredictable and will vary even the same place if a network happens again.

01:02:42.000 --> 01:03:03.000
I think there are challenges also In both, right? One is harder. The human side is harder, definitely. From the infrastructure component, which is a little bit more under our control, I think there are definitely ways to enhance the modeling. But one tricky part, I guess, that we find in the disaster risk analysis field is

01:03:03.000 --> 01:03:22.000
To get data on the facilities themselves. So, so far there is amazing data from HCAI and that is posted. It's a viable, it's updated every year if I know, if I understand correctly But it's posted so you can see your hospital you can see what rating it has and we utilize that information to build these models, right?

01:03:22.000 --> 01:03:49.000
There might be some privacy concerns. I'm sure that's why we don't share all the structural drawings of the buildings, I'm assuming so but that that's kind of a part of the information that we don't have that can make models a little bit more challenging as well into how we map the infrastructure, the hospital infrastructure with higher fidelity or the roads, for example. It's also a problem that I think goes in different infrastructure sectors.

01:03:49.000 --> 01:04:06.000
But yeah, I think the more I think people have developed amazing models for predicting what can happen in an extreme event so I think that the problem is the match, I think, between data that we have for original analysis and how we can couple that to more high fidelity models.

01:04:06.000 --> 01:04:16.000
Can I add here, just working on the legislative side, we are going to see more data related to the services provided too, which will allow us to model some of the disaster response.

01:04:16.000 --> 01:04:34.000
As well. So it's good. I think it's great to see the constructural modeling. I was excited to see that when we couple it with the services in those buildings, which hospitals will be required to report. I think it'll give us a sense of what buildings have patient services, what buildings don't have patient services.

01:04:34.000 --> 01:04:42.000
And then, of course, match that with our disaster preparedness and evacuation plan. So I think it'll be a good combination.

01:04:42.000 --> 01:04:48.000
Catherine, can you expand on that a little bit more about the modeling that you see on your end?

01:04:48.000 --> 01:05:03.000
So, and honestly, it was an opportunity and I invite Trina here. It was great to see the modeling from the structural side. I know our hospitals do that individually and we're starting to look at it regionally. So I was keenly interested in the presentation related to the Bay Area modeling but what we

01:05:03.000 --> 01:05:15.000
Don't see largely or haven't seen largely in what HCAI was trying to figure out how to get from us so that we could look at this is the services in the building, right? So you know what the building's going to do.

01:05:15.000 --> 01:05:18.000
But we didn't know if the building was going to do that with a PICU in it.

01:05:18.000 --> 01:05:34.000
Or a janitor's closet, right? So very different evacuation modeling, et cetera. We kind of know now what patient modeling or patient services are in there, but knowing whether it's an ER, kind of easy to see if you drive by versus

01:05:34.000 --> 01:05:47.000
Med-surg. Ambulatory surgery center, et cetera, is important to how we manage the post-disaster plan.

01:05:47.000 --> 01:05:48.000
So.

01:05:48.000 --> 01:05:59.000
I can add a little bit on that too. That was a new law that required a hospital that was SPC below a certain threshold to submit to HCAI.

01:05:59.000 --> 01:06:04.000
And also to OES, we are collecting that data as well.

01:06:04.000 --> 01:06:20.000
Professor Luis if you are interested to model instead of presenting the bed You can also provide what a service after the hayward scenario that will not be available for the community.

01:06:20.000 --> 01:06:21.000
Great.

01:06:21.000 --> 01:06:27.000
So you can reach out to me. I have less I can connect you with the right people. Yeah. Kira, that was a great question I can answer as well.

01:06:27.000 --> 01:06:41.000
From the challenges model The one challenge is depleting inventory. We learned that compared to what we collected with what has default bidding inventory, there's a big gap that it's very different.

01:06:41.000 --> 01:06:46.000
So maybe they have higher resolution data that is not available for the public.

01:06:46.000 --> 01:06:51.000
But then that's the effort we're trying to address the statewide building inventory.

01:06:51.000 --> 01:07:06.000
Also that the cost of retrofit when we, as you are seeing we use or the document. And then we talked to a local jurisdiction who has recently done seismic retrofit on fire station the data is quite a spread.

01:07:06.000 --> 01:07:12.000
So if they are data collection on that will give us a better idea, especially for the mitigation project.

01:07:12.000 --> 01:07:30.000
Which one is more cost effective, right? And then um and then Also, there's issue come up on the is one of the great interest for this project is to understand the garage opener because This project is inspired after the Ferndale earthquake. The fire station once again was delayed.

01:07:30.000 --> 01:07:42.000
By 30 minutes because the garage door jammed. And thank God at that time there's no medical emergency nobody died because they couldn't provide an EMS service of our ongoing fire.

01:07:42.000 --> 01:07:55.000
So we were interested to benchmark that since we're collecting those data, which fire station based on the USGS segment map that are more likely to be stuck right to to understand the risk.

01:07:55.000 --> 01:08:19.000
But after reaching out to the industry, there's no such a milestone or a specification that how they affect their even newer generation of garage door opener than what the seismic performance, what's the industry specification So even it's clear in building code ASC7 that the fire station as essential facilities need to remain operational.

01:08:19.000 --> 01:08:40.000
But then if there's based on my understanding talking to the industry, if there's lack of specification for the vendors to comply, then how do we know that they actually Even the new fire station that it can be can remain operational. So that's a

01:08:40.000 --> 01:08:47.000
One of the challenges we noticed and then So, um.

01:08:47.000 --> 01:08:58.000
Given that before there's established criteria for the industry. I think it might be a great opportunity for earthquake early warning activated garage door opener too.

01:08:58.000 --> 01:09:10.000
Bridge a gap. So that's maybe something that USGS are willing to take a lead to be the champion on this issue. We have some contacts we can connect to.

01:09:10.000 --> 01:09:15.000
Yeah, and it's interesting how you're highlighting that one detail can make a really big difference.

01:09:15.000 --> 01:09:18.000
Yeah.

01:09:18.000 --> 01:09:34.000
I have a follow-on question. You guys have to be giving us some questions. Kiera and I are about to run out of our seed questions here. So Jacques, as you were talking about fire stations, I guess one thing that came to my mind is it's about jurisdiction.

01:09:34.000 --> 01:09:43.000
So I'm sure there's mutual aid agreements between counties or cities. I'm already saying words. I'm not, you know.

01:09:43.000 --> 01:09:58.000
I'm not authorized to talk about. Is that something you would like to be modeling as well is that you know is there is there any precedent for considering jurisdictional models in hazard modeling as well?

01:09:58.000 --> 01:10:23.000
So they're in mutual aid and then uh the that's also what we noticed that after the Frendale earthquake that we want to focus on fire station because the 911 calls actually was The fire stations serve as a call center and then emergency response that the goods donate was flowing through the fire station and then distribute

01:10:23.000 --> 01:10:45.000
First through the fire station network that emergency response or emergency response or food and water are distributed. So it will be very interesting to see that after disaster, how what's the network look like?

01:10:45.000 --> 01:10:50.000
But that require a lot of data that We currently do not have.

01:10:50.000 --> 01:11:07.000
So we have the first step is to, but in the survey we actually did collect some other information other than in the building, such as if they have a emergency field And then how many hours would that be can sustain the fire station

01:11:07.000 --> 01:11:28.000
And then telecommunication. Equipment and readiness So all those great information are collected through this survey. So we are working with our agency on how do we release the data, what can be released so hopefully researchers are willing to look at the data and model.

01:11:28.000 --> 01:11:49.000
And not to be a doomsday sayer here, but Luis, you showed a map of, you know, and Kiara, you know, personally said, oh, that's my hospital. And it sounds like she's going to have to go to across the bridge to San Francisco or across another bridge to Sausalito. And I guess those predictions you're making, I'm assuming that modeling was geographic only and not

01:11:49.000 --> 01:11:57.000
Kaiser versus whatever insurance network might be in, right? That's probably another layer to complicate everything.

01:11:57.000 --> 01:12:14.000
Yeah, no, so far we only considered infrastructure and how close you are to it. But that definitely adds a layer of of complexity. We saw in Turkey also that um many doctors got resourceful and work on the parking lot right in like in the most of my university

01:12:14.000 --> 01:12:25.000
I don't even know if that would be feasible in many hospitals given liabilities and what can happen so it's um yeah so there's a level of complexity there.

01:12:25.000 --> 01:12:33.000
Yeah, there's like, there's like a, I don't have a fully formed question, but I think it's really interesting to consider, you know, how people adapt.

01:12:33.000 --> 01:12:43.000
In reality. So I don't know what the question is, but if there's any Any interesting insights people have about seeing how people adapt in hospital climates?

01:12:43.000 --> 01:12:45.000
After events like earthquakes. It'd be interesting to share.

01:12:45.000 --> 01:13:03.000
I mean, we witnessed in Turkey that doctors were talking about getting lines of patients and doing splints and doing splints stitches and whatever was quick, you know, and didn't even get their names it was just you know trying to shuffle people through. And I don't know how

01:13:03.000 --> 01:13:09.000
The system would react here with insurance and everything else if that If that would happen the same way.

01:13:09.000 --> 01:13:31.000
I think the other point was kind of speaking to the the modeling and the community resilience aspect that I think Luis brought up something in the in his presentation about his presentation about people's houses being damaged. But we heard stories of hospitals that were lacking doctors and staff because the kids schools were damaged and

01:13:31.000 --> 01:13:40.000
They left. They just moved. And so the whole workforce was depleted because people just left the damaged areas.

01:13:40.000 --> 01:13:49.000
And, you know, it's sort of that secondary community resilience aspect that's probably very difficult to and put some Model 2.

01:13:49.000 --> 01:14:04.000
Well, I mean, we have some experience with that, though, when we think about the LA fires as well as the Paradise fires and other natural disasters that have destroyed living areas in that region. We are currently working hard to keep our workforce in LA.

01:14:04.000 --> 01:14:23.000
So oftentimes, and this is where I'm being part of systems and mutual aid that we do Both with our current hospitals and our hospitals across the state. And then, of course, there is a role for FEMA here. People, even though FEMA would like to just pay for things, right? Trump would just like to pay for FEMA. There is a role for that mutual aid across state lines.

01:14:23.000 --> 01:14:36.000
Where we, and in COVID, we did the same thing where we work to bring in temporary staff and temporary doctors. So our disaster plans look at both our short term and long-term ramifications. And then we do have the experience, like I said.

01:14:36.000 --> 01:14:54.000
From unfortunately too many disasters in California that allow us to look at the long-term ramifications as soon as the disaster is over while simultaneously managing the short term. And to your point about records, et cetera, we of course manage all acute immediately to standard disaster response.

01:14:54.000 --> 01:15:09.000
Manage patient records either through paper or if the system's still up, backup plans for all of that as well. And then, of course, going forward, bring up those systems as quickly as we can. Trina managed our disaster response in many areas, so I don't know if you have additional

01:15:09.000 --> 01:15:13.000
Thoughts on that. I thought I'd just give sort of a general overview because I think someone had a question related to that.

01:15:13.000 --> 01:15:34.000
Yeah, I think the LA fire, unfortunately, the recent LA fires is another example of some of the uh kind of particularly for some of the larger systems where we're looking at Things like bringing in doctors, nurses, et cetera, from other states, especially if systems have other hospitals in other states, for example, and those are part of their plans and thinking as they think about

01:15:34.000 --> 01:15:51.000
Disasters that occur, such as the LAFR most recently. And also, I think one of the things, and Gordy, you touched upon it a little bit, is Unfortunately, in the LA fires, we had staff that people who actually personally impacted, right? They lost their homes, their schools were closed.

01:15:51.000 --> 01:16:10.000
Et cetera. But they're still there showing up to work every day. But then in a prolonged disaster particularly You know, just burnout becomes a real issue. So how do you ensure that Those things are in place so that, for example, the state can, for example.

01:16:10.000 --> 01:16:22.000
Blanket, which is what they did for LA fires for example They can get people licensed quickly so that there is people taking over after being, you know.

01:16:22.000 --> 01:16:49.000
Being on call or being on for days on end without thing and when their own personal life is affected by a disaster. So those kinds of things are critical and important as hospitals and other facilities plan for disasters, because I think that every part of the healthcare delivery system is literally looking at this because it's become a challenge when you

01:16:49.000 --> 01:16:53.000
Thank you for that. Sarah has a question. Go ahead, Sarah.

01:16:53.000 --> 01:17:12.000
While this is a little bit of a curveball, but USGS is one of the partners in building an earthquake early warning system in California, and we all Curious about whether the hospital and file communities have been thinking about utilizing the warning system as part of their

01:17:12.000 --> 01:17:24.000
Response retrofit action plans for things like opening fire station doors and that sort of thing. And I was just curious what you knew about your communities.

01:17:24.000 --> 01:17:30.000
I think Trina and I are texting each other to figure out who's answering that, but go ahead first from the fire standpoint.

01:17:30.000 --> 01:17:49.000
Sure, I can fill in from the fire station point. I know that our agency OES has issued grants for the fire station who are willing to take on EW efforts. So I know that One requirement is they also document that how they use it, what's the process so

01:17:49.000 --> 01:18:02.000
So we can collect really data that what are the pinpoints and what's the roadblock to to make this more common technology to address this issue.

01:18:02.000 --> 01:18:08.000
So hopefully we have more data from EW team to share.

01:18:08.000 --> 01:18:15.000
Maybe next year's workshop, Sarah.

01:18:15.000 --> 01:18:27.000
Do you want to grab it from the hospital standpoint? I know our hospitals drill two and I think would be excited about any early warning system And have been monitoring this progress.

01:18:27.000 --> 01:18:46.000
Yeah, so hospitals are required. There's federal grants. We have a person here at CHA whose whole job is literally to work with hospitals around disaster planning and mitigation related issues. That is her whole job. So she's always out in the field doing various trainings. Of course, she's on fire duty right now with the LA fires.

01:18:46.000 --> 01:18:57.000
And working not only with our federal partners from FEMA, from federal HHS, of course, our state partners, Cal OES, CDPH, and the cavalcade of alphabet soup.

01:18:57.000 --> 01:19:19.000
That we all deal with on a daily basis. And that is her primary job and and any updates we have from you know from from physical disasters to other disasters, you know, another disaster is what I mean by a non-physical, non-natural disasters like cyber attacks. It's a plethora of types of disasters that hospitals

01:19:19.000 --> 01:19:28.000
Are required to plan for. Required to train staff to respond to in those kinds of events.

01:19:28.000 --> 01:19:34.000
Great, thank you. I see two hands. So Ruth Harris, would you like to go ahead?

01:19:34.000 --> 01:19:47.000
Hi, thanks. And thank you for the presentations. I learned so much and I also realized that my office uh building at work that many of us do work in is not nowhere near as well prepared as all those hospitals and fire stations that you are.

01:19:47.000 --> 01:19:56.000
Talking about. So one thing I was wondering about is fire of course has been a well-known risk to humans for as long as humans have been around.

01:19:56.000 --> 01:19:59.000
And then earthquakes we now understand pretty well how they work.

01:19:59.000 --> 01:20:07.000
So when designing or retrofitting both hospitals and fire stations. How are those two hazards?

01:20:07.000 --> 01:20:17.000
Balanced when you're trying to reduce the risk So like in the talk about the fire stations, there was mention of wood frame buildings doing better.

01:20:17.000 --> 01:20:27.000
But I'm thinking wood frame buildings are more susceptible to fire. So how for both hospitals and fire stations, how are those decisions made?

01:20:27.000 --> 01:20:45.000
I guess mostly by the engineers about how to mitigate both of those both of those types of hazards, because I guess there would be different uh different approaches for each of those different types of hazards. Thank you. And I really appreciated the talks.

01:20:45.000 --> 01:21:00.000
Maybe just speak to that there's not that many new wood framed hospitals being built, you know, it's often just a one story maybe more rural facilities, but those rural ones may be more subject to fires. I certainly am not an expert to speaking on

01:21:00.000 --> 01:21:14.000
You know, the way to harden a building to a to a forest fire or other things. So it's it's a sort of a different discipline, but an interesting question that I hadn't considered too much before, so.

01:21:14.000 --> 01:21:17.000
Can't help you too much on the answer to that one.

01:21:17.000 --> 01:21:40.000
That's a great question. Story we heard is some jurisdiction that The authority doesn't want to spend money on seismic retrofit but when it comes to the the wildfire risk they actually are willing to spend the time to to actually build a brand new fire station. And that is not a woods this time.

01:21:40.000 --> 01:21:49.000
So I understand that sometimes the hazard that they overlap like a you know when you move the heavy equipment up to the roof for the for the flood.

01:21:49.000 --> 01:22:03.000
Then it elevated the weight and then make it more seismic vulnerable. So that's actually one of the topics that our seismic safety commission together with USGS and CGS and female climate change and earthquake.

01:22:03.000 --> 01:22:17.000
A workshop one of the sessions is talk about how we think holistically on multi-hazard mitigation so that's an excellent question I will add you to the list.

01:22:17.000 --> 01:22:23.000
Thank you, Gordy. Yeah, thank you.

01:22:23.000 --> 01:22:28.000
Okay, next up, Grace Parker.

01:22:28.000 --> 01:22:48.000
Hi, everyone. Thanks for that really interesting session. I have a question that I think is for Luis, but Maybe not. I'm not sure. And it's about seismic demand. And so I noticed in your presentation, you showed PGA as the metric being used

01:22:48.000 --> 01:23:09.000
As the input to your risk analysis and fragility functions. Is that typical Or are there other seismic demand parameters that are of particular importance for hospitals? And then also, what about structural versus non-structural components? And do we understand kind of what's important?

01:23:09.000 --> 01:23:12.000
For those two types of systems.

01:23:12.000 --> 01:23:20.000
Yeah, that's an excellent question. I love that question. So here I think we're constrained a little bit by the limitations of data.

01:23:20.000 --> 01:23:40.000
On one end, I think on one, I guess one extreme of the spectrum we like to model what happens with one hospital and what happens with each non-structural component and see how different spaces the common functional and match it to the services that the hospital provides. We've done in other projects but

01:23:40.000 --> 01:23:57.000
That typically requires a lot of information from the hospital. What we got access to in California at the large scale of the region of the Bay Area is data that kind of summarizes what happens in one building rather than what happens in each story of the building.

01:23:57.000 --> 01:24:05.000
So that constrains a lot. In terms of what we can do modeling wise for regional risk analysis.

01:24:05.000 --> 01:24:11.000
So, so far we use a hassle-like fragility function. So we use PGAs to quantify probability of damage.

01:24:11.000 --> 01:24:26.000
I think that opportunity is there because we have the period of structure. There are opportunities to go and do a spectral acceleration and model model that a bit better. I think definitely that happens. That we can do. For the non-structural component part, what we did is we um

01:24:26.000 --> 01:24:29.000
Use the MPC ratings to adjust also fragility functions from Razus.

01:24:29.000 --> 01:24:42.000
Accordingly you know from one to five, more or less matching what the description of these different NPCs have For all different hospital types. For that one also.

01:24:42.000 --> 01:24:58.000
Where we find a challenge is that um found the spectral acceleration there and we try to estimate an approximation of what the big floor acceleration would be But it's like across the buildings, right? The challenge there is that we don't know where they don't necessarily

01:24:58.000 --> 01:25:11.000
The equipment is. We don't know well typically i guess some equipment you can infer but we don't know we don't have the data on Where are the services per floor so we in our model at least, we thought that um

01:25:11.000 --> 01:25:27.000
We should just better use an average version for the entire building height So we kind of assume certain shape for the first mode and to find the peak floor accelerations and use pga and a spectral acceleration to kind of like interpolate something there

01:25:27.000 --> 01:25:36.000
But I think that's somewhere where if we were to have more data, I think we can refine the model because definitely the models are viable for that one. So those, I guess, are the limitations of the model.

01:25:36.000 --> 01:25:39.000
I don't know if that answered the question. I hope it did.

01:25:39.000 --> 01:25:42.000
Yes, thank you. I think it's a difficult problem.

01:25:42.000 --> 01:25:48.000
In practice, it's the short spectral acceleration parameter that's nearly always used.

01:25:48.000 --> 01:25:51.000
So.

01:25:51.000 --> 01:26:01.000
Thank you for the question, Grace. We have probably time for just one question. There's definitely a lot of interest in the garage doors, Josh, so I hope you are checking the chat.

01:26:01.000 --> 01:26:18.000
I wanted to direct the last question to Catherine and Trina. Again, you're in front of earth scientists and engineers and you are you know working you're representing hospitals. And I was wondering if you have any examples of good collaboration.

01:26:18.000 --> 01:26:24.000
Actions that have taken place in all of this work that you've been working on are, for example.

01:26:24.000 --> 01:26:33.000
Maybe phased retrofits or any good solutions that were reached by collaboration.

01:26:33.000 --> 01:26:47.000
Do you want me to jump in just because I've been doing this a long time. So, you know, I think in the last round, and Gordy jump in as well, Jake and Cole was a lot of work in this area. And I think there's a lot of great collaboration, frankly because

01:26:47.000 --> 01:27:06.000
Then last round, we could envelope a building. We could do things that allowed us to kind of manage services a little better. This time we're really going to lean into not just our are all of you on the call or the Zoom where we're looking at engineers, we're going to have to lean into our healthcare specialists

01:27:06.000 --> 01:27:27.000
We're going to have to lean into our regulators. Because when we're making sure that, for example, Cedars-Sinai multi-story building can't build its replica next door so we can't They have to retrofit the current building. They're going to have to go in floor by floor, take care of patients at the same time. So we're going to have to really think about how

01:27:27.000 --> 01:27:39.000
We maintain patient care in buildings that are landlocked And then look at that regional example. Let's just assume that everybody is in construction right now to meet 2030.

01:27:39.000 --> 01:27:55.000
That's not happening, so we're not going to meet 2030, right? So looking at, I mean, Louise, thank you, because when we look at regional models, we have to think about how We're going to take an ER offline to do that construction or half an ER offline to do that construction.

01:27:55.000 --> 01:28:00.000
Even if it's for six months, that's a critical six months for any ER in California.

01:28:00.000 --> 01:28:05.000
You can't take a PICU offline. I mean, you just can't do work around a PICU.

01:28:05.000 --> 01:28:18.000
So if you take it offline, you're taking a PICU, a valuable resource out of the state. So we've got to think about how to do those things and your creative solutions. And again, Gordy's in it every day. Luis is in it every day. Your creative solutions as a field.

01:28:18.000 --> 01:28:34.000
Are going to be what makes us get there. We're not going to get there in 2030, but we're going to need it sooner rather than later. So Trina, I don't know if you have any additions there, but We're going to need all the creativity we can get to do this without jeopardizing patient care in the next 15 years.

01:28:34.000 --> 01:28:49.000
Yeah, just to add upon it, you know, as Kat said, you know, places are landlocked like a Cedars-Sinai they can't build then replicate a 600 plus bed hospital next door. It's impossible. And then you have other kind of regional challenges if you're in

01:28:49.000 --> 01:28:57.000
In Northern Northern California, getting labor up there is a challenge. Getting stuff up there is a challenge, different challenges.

01:28:57.000 --> 01:29:03.000
Then if you're a public hospital or a district hospital, you have your local health care district that you have to kind of work with.

01:29:03.000 --> 01:29:19.000
There's layer upon layer of different kinds of hospitals. It's not a one size fits all kind of solution depending on what kind of hospital you are and others do want to rebuild because they're in a different place, but others just simply can't. So without this collaboration across

01:29:19.000 --> 01:29:28.000
Across the kind of the broader field, getting there, you know, now will be necessary to be able to get to 2030.

01:29:28.000 --> 01:29:32.000
And I think lastly, just patience. It is over $100 billion. And I think I'm now being conservative.

01:29:32.000 --> 01:29:41.000
And when we think about the 200 and some odd plus hospitals and nearly 500 buildings that need to get done in an environment that is now competing to rebuild LA.

01:29:41.000 --> 01:30:03.000
So just have patience. I mean, I know you're all a group of folks who are seriously dedicated to making sure we shake, rattle, and roll and still do patient care. So it's going to be frustrating for those who's hyper focus is on that and we appreciate that. We should own the money for it. I mean, there are hospitals that will not have the money for this. So we're just going to have to find creative financial solutions as well.

01:30:03.000 --> 01:30:14.000
While you're being creative, also please be patient as we're trying to meet this requirement. I don't think there's enough people at Dakin Colt to do this over the next five years, right? The amount of people we have to hire up is crazy for 275,000 people.

01:30:14.000 --> 01:30:17.000
And then…

01:30:17.000 --> 01:30:21.000
Or so 275 hospitals and nearly 500 buildings.

01:30:21.000 --> 01:30:36.000
Yeah, it's a very daunting amount of work to get done. And, you know, we've We've had a lot of success stories recently in terms of utilizing the the best advanced analysis tools that we can to try to dig deeper into the

01:30:36.000 --> 01:31:01.000
Into the modeling and the tools and the best standards available to reduce retrofits and the uh HKI has been a great partner in that, in working with us on practical solutions and trying to come up with The solution that seems and feels and is quantitatively right for the building as opposed to what you might have gotten as the first diagnosis doing this 10 years ago or more.

01:31:01.000 --> 01:31:10.000
So the extra analysis generally does tend to pay off in terms of coming up with leaner solutions for the retrofits.

01:31:10.000 --> 01:31:16.000
Great. Thank you so much. Okay. I think we can conclude this session. I heard we need $100 billion.

01:31:16.000 --> 01:31:21.000
And garage door opener solutions.

01:31:21.000 --> 01:31:22.000
We figured it all out, Aisha. Great.

01:31:22.000 --> 01:31:23.000
Yeah.

01:31:23.000 --> 01:31:27.000
Yes.

01:31:27.000 --> 01:31:49.000
Oh, that was wonderful. Thank you so much to Aisha and Kyora for having run such a wonderful session and doing such a great job moderating and to our wonderful speakers, Ja, Luis, Gordy, Catherine, and Veena, thank you so much. That was wonderful. We have brought home the workshop.

01:31:49.000 --> 01:32:02.000
So I know we're all late, so I won't keep us much longer. I just have to somehow summarize all of this amazing science and engineering and studies that we have heard about over the last three days. So hold on.

01:32:02.000 --> 01:32:12.000
I'm going to put on my thinking hat and attempt to summarize everything.

01:32:12.000 --> 01:32:19.000
Okay, so… First, we learned about Uh.

01:32:19.000 --> 01:32:25.000
Machine learning and we learned that it is not a Lamborghini. It is a Flintstones call.

01:32:25.000 --> 01:32:26.000
So the earth is always changing.

01:32:26.000 --> 01:32:41.000
We also heard about how we have to be the driver of it and understand what's going on under the hood, not just For us to understand what's happening but also for us to be able to build confidence in all people who will end up using these models.

01:32:41.000 --> 01:32:42.000
And confidence in the public that while making choices based on good outputs.

01:32:42.000 --> 01:32:46.000
Earthquakes.

01:32:46.000 --> 01:32:55.000
But that question, and then there was also the issue about having the data to train them, including having data, no results, data that weren't published. And in fact.

01:32:55.000 --> 01:33:13.000
The data that isn't digital and easily available is something that we heard again and again. It's what we heard during the geodesy session, thinking about how much better our models would be if we could easily incorporate data that have been going back decades to give us decadal long changes. It's also something that we heard about when we talked about the Mendocino triple junction.

01:33:13.000 --> 01:33:19.000
And all this great work that Team 54 did to learn about the 1954 earthquake.

01:33:19.000 --> 01:33:43.000
In fact, another thing that we heard about a lot was the importance of not waiting for the next earthquake, but looking back at Earthclothes you've already seen we saw We've learned a lot by putting things that happen now in the context of things that happened before by going back and looking at the things that happened before. So taking the most recent MTJ earthquakes, but then going back and looking at the 75 earthquake.

01:33:43.000 --> 01:33:50.000
The 2001 earthquake I mean, the 2021 earthquake, the 92 earthquake, the 54 earthquake.

01:33:50.000 --> 01:33:55.000
And getting a much better view of what's happening at the triple junction.

01:33:55.000 --> 01:34:00.000
We heard about the statewide models that are being built out, the new fault models.

01:34:00.000 --> 01:34:10.000
And when you put that all together, you can't help but wonder that if this might not be a good moment to let the court lead the horse or the horse lead the court. A lot of times we start building these community models, we look around and we ask

01:34:10.000 --> 01:34:24.000
What is the what do we know about the fourth geometry but we are still building out the full geometry in some parts of California. And perhaps as we expand the statewide models, this would be a good time to collaborate with the people doing the thought borrowing to figuring out to help

01:34:24.000 --> 01:34:33.000
We go out and help support understanding where the faults are more to build out our fault models and then our shaking models based on the fault models.

01:34:33.000 --> 01:34:46.000
We learned about the importance of um knowing who's going to be hurt by an earthquake this could be understanding vulnerabilities.

01:34:46.000 --> 01:35:10.000
How quickly different communities need to have services restored after an earthquake. The importance of schools and maintaining economies and people's lives And that, of course, in order to be able to be prepared for these for disasters, we have to know where these vulnerable communities and vulnerable infrastructure is before the earthquake happens. And so we need to

01:35:10.000 --> 01:35:22.000
To do these studies now, but also we have to keep doing them because the world is dynamic and the world is For example, a lot different post-COVID than it was pre-COVID. The hospitals are currently in the process of being retrofitted and so

01:35:22.000 --> 01:35:28.000
Their vulnerabilities are changing day to day.

01:35:28.000 --> 01:35:34.000
We had an earthquake in just a month ago and we're already learning a lot of important things about that.

01:35:34.000 --> 01:35:44.000
We have new data coming up. Big new data, new Intel missions, and it's going to provide a wealth of data that we have to understand how to use and how to distribute easily.

01:35:44.000 --> 01:35:52.000
And two very important things that we learned. Peggy Helvic told us that if there have been two interplate earthquakes in the mendister Triple Junction.

01:35:52.000 --> 01:35:59.000
Then it must be possible to have an interplated earthquake in the triple junction. And Andy Michael reminded us that Bob Wallace said that if it did happen.

01:35:59.000 --> 01:36:08.000
It could happen. And on those wards. I think we should call this the 2025 Northern California earthquake Hazards Workshop.

01:36:08.000 --> 01:36:17.000
Till next year, everyone.

01:36:17.000 --> 01:36:18.000
Thank you, Sarah.

01:36:18.000 --> 01:36:21.000
The surface of the earth is always changing. Mountains and valleys rearranging.

01:36:21.000 --> 01:36:27.000
Thank you, SarahThank you, sir.That's